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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
Throughout this report, the 2-letter country codes are used as defined by the 
International Organization for Standardization: 
http://www.iso.org/iso/country_names_and_code_elements 
Other abbreviations and acronyms are: 
CfD Contract for difference 
DG ENER Directorate General for Energy of the European Commission 
DKK Danish Krone 
EC European Commission 
EU European Union 
FiT Feed-in tariff (scheme) 
FiP Feed-in premium (scheme) 
FLH Equivalent full-load hours 
GBP British Pound Sterling 
GO Grid Operator 
GW Gigawatt 
kW Kilowatt 
LCCC Low-Carbon Contracts Company 
MS Member State (of the EU) 
MW Megawatt 
MWh Megawatt-hour 
NREAP National Renewable Energy Action Plan 
PLN Polish Zloty 
PO Plant Operator 
RES Renewable energy system/source 
RON Romanian Leu 
RVO Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland (Netherlands Enterprise Agency) 
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Executive Summary 
This document is the first deliverable corresponding to the study on the social and 
economic value of wind energy. This study is divided into four parts: (i) regulatory 
framework, (ii) wind power technology aspects, (iii) wind energy market status and (iv) 
economic and non-economic impacts of wind energy. The results obtained in the first 
part will be presented in two deliverables: Deliverable 1 (the present document) and 
Deliverable 7, an update to be submitted in August 2016. 
Methodology 
Following the general methodology proposed for this project, a literature review of 
scientific publications was performed. However, due to the continuously-evolving 
nature of the regulatory framework, some of the conclusions drawn from literature 
review should be contextualised by taking into account the specific circumstances 
(market as much as regulation) at the time each piece of research was published. In 
order to provide an updated picture, other sources different than scientific 
publications were used, including periodically-updated databases and recently-
released policy reports. 
Results 
Feed-in tariffs (FiTs), followed by feed-in premiums (FiP) are the most common support 
schemes in EU Member States. FiTs ensure a relatively high level of security for 
investors, but FiTs are not affected by market signals (what has been called market 
compatibility) which is an essential condition for achieving a high penetration of wind 
energy in the electricity system. This concern made the recent Guidelines on State aid 
for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020 [67] to call for higher market 
compatibility by requiring generators to participate in the electricity market as well as 
by selecting the subsidised remuneration by competitive bidding. In this regard, recent 
changes have taken place in some Member States such as new tendering schemes in 
Italy and France or the new Contract for Difference scheme implemented in the United 
Kingdom. 
This document also explores other regulatory aspects such as grid connection 
procedures, grid operation requirements, distribution of the connection costs, priority 
access to the grid and balancing responsibilities. Most Member States operate with 
the so-called shallow approach to grid connection costs: the plant developer bears the 
grid extension costs and, if necessary, the grid operator bears the grid reinforcement 
costs1. In the case of offshore wind the ultra-shallow approach (the plant developer 
                                                        
 
1 Grid extension refers to the construction of the new electrical infrastructure to connect the new plant 
to the existing grid. Grid reinforcement is referred to as the necessary actions/modifications to the 
existing electricity grid in order to integrate the new wind farm. 
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just bears the costs of the wind farm inner electrical infrastructure and substation) is 
the most common way of allocating connection costs. 
Reported barriers to wind energy deployment are also presented in this study. A major 
issue is the number of retroactive and retrospective measures2 that took place in some 
Member States. Long and complex administrative procedures for wind farm projects 
and grid connection as well as increasing occurrence of curtailment are also issues 
commonly reported in some Member States. 
Support schemes, grid connection approaches for sharing the costs, granting of priory 
or guaranteed access to wind power plants, requirement of balancing responsibility by 
wind farms and reported barriers for further wind energy deployment are featured in 
Table 1, where the barriers considered as more severe this is shown in bold. 













AT FiT Deep Yes No 
 Spatial and environmental planning 
 Cost of administrative procedure 
BE TGC Shallow Yes Yes 
 Uncertainty of the support scheme 
 Long lead time for grid connection 
 Complexity of administrative procedure 
BG FiT Shallow No No 
 Retroactive measures 
 Lack of fair and independent regulation 
 Lack of transparency on the 
connection procedure 
CY FiT Deep Yes No 
 Lack of electricity market competition 
 Complexity of administrative procedure 
CZ - Deep No No 
 Support scheme cancelled 
Transparency of the connection 
procedure 









 Grid development 











EE FiP Deep No Yes 
 Lack of reliable support scheme 
 Complex connection procedure 
 Complex administrative procedure 
                                                        
 
2 Retrospective changes are defined as regulatory changes acting on existing plant that take effect from 
the date of publication of the new norm. On the other hand, retroactive changes on existing plant take 
effect from a previous date. 














ES Tender Shallow Yes Yes 
 Lack of reliable support scheme 
 Retroactive measures 
 Grid development 
 Complex administrative procedure 
FI FiP Deep No Yes 
 Spatial planning 
 Complex connection procedure 
 Grid development 
FR Tender Shallow No No 
 Lack of stable support 
 Complex administrative procedure 
 Long lead time for grid connection 
GR FiT Shallow Yes No 
 Lack of reliable support scheme 
 Grid development 





Shallow Yes Yes 
 Lack of reliable support scheme 
 No call for tenders since 2007 
 Lack of transparency of the connection 
procedure 
HR FiT Deep No No 
 No new purchase agreements from 
January 2015 
 Cost of connection procedure 
 Spatial Planning 
IE FiT Shallow Yes No 






Shallow Yes No 
 Long lead time for grid connection 





 Reliability of the regulatory framework 
 Complex administrative procedure 
 Long lead time for grid connection 
LU FiT Deep No No 
 Existence and reliability of general 
renewable energy strategy and support 
scheme 





Deep No Yes 
 Reliability of the regulatory 
framework 
 Lack of liberalised electricity market 
 Grid development 





Shallow No Yes 
 Reliability of the general RES strategy 
 Grid development 
 Spatial Planning 
PL TGC Shallow Yes Yes 
 Reliability of the regulatory framework 
 Long administrative procedure 
Grid development 
PT Tender Shallow Yes No 
 Reliability of the regulatory 
framework 
 Long and complex administrative 
procedure 














 Long and complex connection 
procedure 
RO TGC Shallow Yes Yes 
 Retroactive measures 
 Lack of market competition 
 Grid development 
 Lack of transparency of the grid 
connection procedure 
SE TGC Deep No Yes 
 Low remuneration level 
 Grid development 
SI FiP Shallow Yes Yes 
 Reliability of the regulatory framework 
 Duration of the administrative process 





 Reliability of the general RES-E 






 Long and costly administrative 
procedure 
 Insufficient total budget for large scale 
RES support 
 Costly connection costs 
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1. Introduction 
The Renewable Energy Directive 2009/28/EC [1] established a European framework to 
promote renewable energy and set mandatory national targets in order to achieve at 
least a 20 % renewable energy share in final energy consumption by 2020. Each 
Member State (MS) was required to set out the sectoral targets by means of National 
Renewable Energy Action Plans (NREAP). Also, each individual plan had to define the 
technology mix scenario, the trajectory to be followed and the measures and reforms 
to overcome barriers and ensure the deployment of renewable energy. 
As each MS has different objectives and also independent choice of policy support, 
each government set a specific regulatory framework, especially in terms of support 
strategies, but also regarding administrative procedures and access to the grid. In this 
study, these three topics are analysed for the particular case of wind energy, by 
comparing the individual implementations adopted in each country. 
1.1. Literature overview on regulatory framework for wind energy 
integration  
For this study, support schemes have been widely analysed in the existing scientific 
literature. The research that we reviewed can be classified into two main areas: (i) 
scheme design—taking into account considerations such as cost and risks for both 
investors and society— and (ii) analysis on their performance and effectiveness. 
Couture and Gagnon (20103) [2] presented the advantages and disadvantages of 
different design options for feed-in tariffs (FiT) and feed-in premiums (FiP). Specific 
features, such as inflation adjustment, degression rate and floor or ceiling price are 
analysed by identifying the impact on risk for investors, and overall cost of renewable 
energy deployment. Hiroux and Saguan (2010) [3] discussed how electricity markets 
could be designed in order to host a significant amount of wind energy, concluding 
that wind power producers should be exposed to market signals. To this end, a FiP 
seems to be the most suitable option, since the risk for producers is controlled to some 
extent and renewable generators are exposed to market signals. Kitzing et al. (2012) 
[4] analysed the possible trend to a harmonised regulatory framework within each MS 
and studied the development of support schemes during 2000 – 2011, concluding that 
a slight tendency is observed for a natural, bottom-up convergence. 
Risk implications were studied by Lemming (2003) [5] by analysing how the higher risk 
associated to tradable green certificates (TGC) markets —compared with FiTs— results 
in higher income required by investors. A similar conclusion on the relationship 
between risk and return requirements by investors was drawn by Held et al. [6] in 2006. 
Dinica (2006) [7] also focused on the perspective of investors and concluded that it is 
                                                        
 
3 The publishing year is indicated for each study, since policy measures are continuously evolving and 
conclusion of some studies should be contextualised to the corresponding particular situation. 
WindValueEU  Part 1: Regulatory Framework 
6 
necessary to take into account factors other than financing and economic obstacles. 
Klessmann et al. [8] in 2008 analysed the consequences of market risk exposure in 
Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom, analysing both price and 
forecasting/balancing risks. If wind generators are responsible for balancing, there is 
an incentive for producers to minimise imbalance costs with the consequent benefits 
for the grid. Conversely, this approach would lead to higher risk premiums (especially 
for the case of small producers, since the forecasting quality improves for aggregated 
generators). This fact may also lead to a market concentration of larger players. 
Furthermore, as the predictability of wind is limited, liquid intraday and balancing 
markets are necessary for the efficient integration of wind generation in the electricity 
market. Klessmann et al. [9] showed in 2013 that risk-sensitive policies are crucial for 
attracting investors by: (i) reducing financing costs, (ii) decreasing project development 
costs and (iii) increasing market revenues. These authors remarked that policy and 
administrative risks can be reduced at low cost, since exposing projects to this kind of 
risk does not produce any positive effect from a macro-economic point of view. Kitzing 
(2014) [10] compared the risk implications of FiTs and FiPs by a mean-variance risk 
analysis. The results obtained by Monte Carlo simulation show that, for the same level 
of attractiveness, FiT require lower direct support than FiPs. The author estimates that 
up to 40 % higher remuneration is required in the case of FiPs to attract a similar 
investment than a FiT. 
An assessment of the effectiveness of support schemes was presented by Mitchell et 
al. (2006) [11] by comparing the performance of the United Kingdom Renewable 
Obligation scheme (a TGC) and the FiT applied in Germany. The authors concluded 
that low-risk policies show higher effectiveness and, more specifically, that the German 
FiT implicated better investment conditions than the certificates system offered in 
United Kingdom. Also Toke (2007) [12] concluded that the certificates system in the 
United Kingdom does not imply a lower cost than a FiT. In 2011, Klessmann et al. [13] 
evaluated the status of renewable energy deployment in the EU by means of the 
effectiveness indicator presented in [14]. The results showed that during the period 
2003-2009 the highest average policy effectiveness was reached for onshore wind 
(4.2 %), followed by biofuels (3.6 %) biomass electricity (2.7 %), biogas (1.6 %) and 
photovoltaic (1.5 %). Germany was the country with higher effectiveness indicator for 
onshore wind (10.2 %), followed by Spain (7.4 %) and Portugal (7.1 %). Haas et al. 
(2011) [15] also argued that FiTs provide higher deployment and at lower costs than 
TGCs systems, and suggested that the better performance of FiTs is mainly because: 
(i) FiTs are easy to implement and can be revised to account for new capacities in a 
very short time; (ii) administration costs are lower than in case of trading schemes and 
(iii) FiTs can be easily tailored to each specific technology. 
Cardoso and Fuinhas (2012) [16] conducted an empirical analysis by a Panel Corrected 
Standard estimator. The study examines the evolution of renewable energy sources 
during 1990-2007 and it concludes that FiTs have been effective in fostering renewable 
energy use in European countries, but TGCs did not show evidence of producing the 
desired effect. Jenner et al. (2013) [17] analysed the effectiveness of FiTs from an 
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econometric point of view. The authors established a relationship between the increase 
of return of investment (ROI) and the installed power. The research concluded that a 
10 % increase in ROI would imply an average increment of 2.8 % in yearly installed 
capacity. 
The influence of grid issues on the deployment of wind energy has also been an issue 
studied in detail in the scientific literature. Barth et al. (2008) [18] described the 
different approaches for connection costs allocation. The research remarks that grid 
connection costs are clearly attributable to renewable generators but grid 
reinforcement costs cannot be attributed solely to one source. However, it is also 
stated that performing a fair distribution of these costs is not easy. The authors remark 
that deep (or semi-deep) connection charges can be used to address the specific needs 
in a certain location of the grid by taking into account the generation/consumption 
profile. This kind of grid connection charges incentivises investors to place new 
generators in regions with scarce electricity supply, rather than to put them in regions 
with already abundant generation. Swider et al. (2008) [19] compared the grid 
connection conditions and costs in selected European countries (Germany, the 
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Austria, Lithuania and Slovenia); the 
research concludes that the allocation of connection costs can be an important barrier 
for renewable energy installations if the developer has to bear all of them. The 
implications of connection cost sharing for offshore wind energy were discussed by 
Weißensteiner et al. (2008) [20] who found that offshore installations passing the grid 
connection costs to grid operators results in lower surplus for the producers and, 
hence, lower transfer costs for final consumers. 
The factors influencing energy curtailment were analysed by Porter et al. (2007) [21]. 
Flexibility of generating mix; existence of well-functioning and deep hour-ahead and 
day-ahead markets; geographical distribution of the wind resource; capacity of 
transmission and size of the control areas are the main aspects that will determine how 
easy would be the integration of renewable energy in a certain region. Vandezande et 
al. (2010) [22] discussed the necessity of balancing requirements for wind farms in case 
of high penetration scenarios. Well-functioning balancing markets would be essential 
to incorporate wind generators in the balancing process. Finally, Batlle et al. (2012) [23] 
state that exposing renewable energy generators to the cost of imbalances enhances 
their ability to estimate their production and hence minimizing the cost of reserves for 
the whole system. 
1.2. Introduction to support schemes  
Policy support to renewable energy is usually performed by the combination of several 
measures. FiTs, FiPs or quota obligations (combined with TGCs) are usually applied as 
major support instruments [24]; they are discussed in sections 2.1 to 2.3. Section 2.4 
presents an overview of cases where the previous support schemes were suspended 
or changed with retroactive effects. Finally, investments grants, fiscal measures and 
financial support are secondary measures that provide an extra level of support are 
discussed in section 2.5. 
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Support schemes may or may not differentiate among renewable technologies. 
Technology-neutral policies may lead to a market dominated by a few technologies, 
since their state of maturity is not the same, uniform incentives cannot provide enough 
support for technologies in their early stage of development. In addition, uniform 
incentives can contribute to overcompensation for mature technologies when the 
expensive technologies set the marginal price. 
1.2.1. Feed-in tariffs 
A FiT offers a long-term purchase guarantee for the sale of renewable electricity. 
Ideally, FiTs must include three key elements: (i) guarantee of dispatch, (ii) long-term 
commitment and (iii) payment levels based on the costs of the technology. This 
instrument seeks to provide higher security for investors. However, the main drawback 
is the lack of market compatibility, since energy has to be purchased regardless of the 
demand level [25]. An extreme effect of this lack of market compatibility is the 
appearance —in those markets where it is allowed— of negative prices of electricity 
during some off-peak hours [26]. A brief description of FiTs variants is provided below. 
 Fixed price model. 
This model considers a fixed remuneration independent of other economic variables 
such as inflation, electricity market price, price of commodities, etc. Usually, when 
calculating the remuneration level, the effect of the inflation is taken into account. This 
way, the revenues are sufficiently high during the early years of the project. However, 
the real value of the revenues decreases with time due to inflation [27]. As the 
remuneration is known in advance, this support scheme allows developers to assess 
the income of the project with a high degree of certainty being, therefore, a support 
mechanism with low risk for investors. 
 Fixed price model with partial or full price adjustment 
This remuneration scheme is based on a fixed amount updated periodically to track 
changes in the broader economy. The aim of this readjustment is to guarantee a 
proper level of revenues at the end stage of the project, when the effect of the 
cumulative yearly inflation is important and the real value of the revenues can be 
significantly affected if the selling price of the delivered energy is not updated. 
 Front-end loaded model 
This model offers higher tariffs during the early years than in the later years, which is 
intended to (i) avoid overcompensation during the last stage of the project, when the 
capital expenditure is paid off and (ii) concentrate higher income when project 
developers are under higher financial pressure. Another feature of this model is the 
expected reduction of long-running costs of the support policy by reflecting to the 
ratepayer the declining costs that developers have to assume over time. 
1.2.2. Feed-in premium 
A feed-in premium is an additional amount paid for each unit of energy produced on 
top of the electricity market price. Thus, a FiP is considered a market-dependent 
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mechanism because the final remuneration depends on the market price. With a FiP, 
there is some uncertainty about the final payment levels that can be too low or too 
high, and this higher risk has an effect on the total payment that is necessary to attract 
investors. Another factor that increases the risk for investors is that, usually, premiums 
do not offer guarantee of dispatch. According to some published studies, premium 
schemes are about 10 - 30 €/MWh costlier than FiTs [28] [29]. On the other hand, FiP 
policies are more compatible with competitive electricity markets, since they require 
renewable energy plants to participate in the bidding process. As remuneration to the 
wind farm operator increases when the market price is high, an incentive is created to 
produce more energy when it is needed the most [2] and, perhaps more significantly, 
participation in the bidding process would deter wind generators from producing in 
those hours with negative electricity prices. 
A variant of FiP is the spot market gap model. This approach consists of the payment 
of a variable amount that complements the spot market price to reach a previously 
set-up fix remuneration level (similar to a FiT level). Developers eventually receive a 
fixed amount (the set-up FiT) regardless of the spot market price (therefore, this option 
is market independent from the producer's point of view)4. Usually by this support 
scheme, the costs of the policy support shifts from the ratepayer to the taxpayer, since 
the subsidised amount is directly paid by the public budged [30]. 
1.2.3. Quota system and tradable green certificates (TGC) 
This support mechanism is market-based, since the price of the tradable green 
certificates is defined by market equilibrium between the supply and demand for 
certificates. Demand is driven by a determined target for renewable energy 
consumption, i.e. the quotas defined as a percentage of energy generated by 
renewable energy sources. Certificates are tradable financial assets sold on a specific 
market. Thus, the additional cost of producing renewable energy (compared with 
conventional sources) is compensated with the extra income from the sale of 
certificates. The total income obtained by renewable energy producers is the sum of 
the electricity market price plus the selling price for TGC. According to the existing 
literature [31], [32], [33], [34], [35], the main advantages of TGCs are: (i) they are cost-
efficient, since actors would be expected to fund the least expensive projects to 
achieve any particular quota, and (ii) enable a higher exposure of renewable generators 
to market signals. On the other hand, TGC have some disadvantages, mainly related 
to the risk that project developers have to address under this support mechanism [35]: 
(i) renewable projects face uncertainty derived from both future evolutions of 
electricity prices and of TGC prices, and (ii) future evolution of certificate prices can 
lead to under/over compensation. 
  
                                                        
 
4 For this reason from a theoretical point of view, this model is considered by some authors as a feed-
in tariff. However, from the point of view of policy support this method is market dependant, since the 
subsidised amount changes with the spot market prices. 
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2. Overview and comparison of regulatory framework for 
onshore wind energy 
Figure 1 shows an overview of support schemes currently applied for new installations 
in Member States. Cells in dark blue represent support schemes for onshore wind 
energy, orange cells correspond to support schemes tailored to offshore wind energy, 
light blue cells indicate those cases where support schemes are only offered for micro-
wind energy5 and grey cells represent support schemes that are applicable to other 
technologies than wind energy. 
Figure 1 is also indicative of the evolution of support schemes for wind energy in each 
MS. By early 2000, most MSs had implemented support mechanisms to promote 
renewable energy. Nevertheless, continuous changes have been performed, because 
as the renewable energy sector matures policymakers have to face new challenges: 
 Technological/cost evolution. Rigid schemes that are not able to respond to 
quick falls of production costs have to be adapted in order to avoid 
overcompensation and excessive demand for new installations [38]. As an 
example taken from photovoltaic energy market, in the Czech Republic, 1.5 GW 
of new capacity was installed in 2010 achieving a cumulative capacity of 1.95 
GW and exceeding the 2020 target of 1.65 GW set in the National Renewable 
Energy Plan [39]. After this unexpected increase of demand, a number of 
legislative changes took place in the following years and, eventually, the 
suspension of the FiT took place in 2013. 
 Macro-economic changes. The global economic slowdown influenced some 
national budgets, which affected the level of support. 
 Objectives of renewable energy sharing. As shares of renewable electricity 
progress, policymakers need to address new challenges and priorities; moving 
from promoting an initial expansion of the sector to ensuring continuous 
development with lower or no economic support. 
Despite amendments in support policy being necessary, they are also a factor that may 
hinder the confidence of investors. For this reason, stability and transparency are 
                                                        
 
5 In the context of this work, support schemes aimed to micro wind energy are not studied in further 
detail. 
 
Figure 1: Overview of support instruments in EU MS in 2014. Collected and adapted from [36], 
[37] 
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HU HR IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
Feed-in tariff
Feed-in premium
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critical issues that can influence drastically the development of renewable energy 
markets. Loss of confidence is especially severe when the changes and new measures 
are applied with retrospective or retroactive character [38]. 
Risk perception by investors is an important factor to take into account. Pure cost-
benefit analysis is usually not sufficient to assure enough attractiveness, since it only 
considers net benefit as key indicator. Justice [41] suggests that the risk can be 
classified according to the following categories: 
 Policy and regulatory risk (risk of sudden and/or retroactive or retrospective 
changes in the policy framework, budget or capacity caps, permitting and grid 
access risks, etc.) 
 Country and financial risks (government stability, maturity of legal system, 
transparency of business dealings, currency risks, etc.) 
 Technical and project specific risks (construction, technological, environmental, 
operation and management risks) 
 Market risks (market price risks that influence project costs and revenues, e.g. 
feedstock prices, energy market prices, carbon prices, new competitors, etc.) 
Policymakers can play an important role in reducing policy and regulatory risks. A 
proper design of the scheme and of the administrative procedures in the permitting 
process is essential in order to reduce uncertainty. This would not only avoid 
discouraging investors, but would also reduce the overall cost of the support scheme. 
Higher risk needs to be compensated with higher remuneration levels in order to keep 
the support scheme attractive for investors. According to Rathmann et al. [42], the 
levelised cost of renewable energy could be reduced by up to 10 % if market players 
do not expect sudden policy changes. Similar conclusions (about 5-10 % reduction) 
were drawn by De Jager et al. [43]. 
Most MSs apply the same main support scheme with specific remuneration depending 
on technology; only Estonia offers the same premium regardless of the technology. 
Poland and Sweden implement a technology-neutral TGCs system by issuing the same 
amount of certificates regardless of the technology. 
Additionally, as modifications are performed to adapt the support mechanisms to 
market needs, it is expected that best practices spread. This would be the basis for 
more optimised support schemes and a forthcoming, perhaps more harmonised 
approach to their design, as energy markets integrate and fully use existing 
cooperation mechanisms. Also, this natural harmonisation would be improved by 
competition between national support schemes. As stated in the Communication from 
the Commission, European Commission guidance for the design of renewables support 
schemes [38]: "Regulatory competition between EU member states for renewable 
energy policy will most likely lead to a certain natural convergence as Member States 
design their support mechanisms to attract capital and ensure they meet their national 
renewable energy targets". 
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In the following sections, the specific measures taken in each MS for the promotion of 
onshore wind power plants6 are further detailed. 
 
2.1. Feed-in tariffs for onshore wind power 
Table 2 summarises the specific features of FiTs offered for new onshore wind power 
plants among MSs. Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Lithuania and Slovakia apply a 
fixed FiT model without indexing to inflation. Ireland indexes the remuneration to 
inflation. 
Germany offers the option of a front-end tariff that considers a final period with a 
reduced tariff. The transition time is designated according to the quality of the wind 
resource in the location of the wind farm. By this remuneration model, 
overcompensation for better places is avoided. Also, concentration of onshore wind 
farms in the same geographical area is somehow mitigated. 
In Hungary7, Lithuania and Italy, tenders are employed to set the remuneration to be 
paid to plant operators. Under this procedure plant developers present their bid for a 
certain remuneration taking into account the technical specifications set in the call for 
tenders. The winning bid is selected by considering both technical and economic 
merits. 
Recent developments include schemes that attempt to fine-tune remuneration details 
to avoid overcompensation. For example, in Spain a new support scheme was set in 
2013 that is based on two items on top of market price: remuneration for investment 
(covering the investment costs that cannot be recovered by selling the generated 
energy in the market) and remuneration for operation (that covers, when applicable, 
the difference between the operating costs and the income for participating in the 
market). For existing installations, the remuneration is set by law taking into account a 
reasonable profitability that would obtain a standard facility. As a reference, in the case 
of wind power plants the remuneration for operation applicable for the year 2014 is 
zero and the remuneration for investment ranges from 8 294 €/MW (for a wind farm 
commissioned in 2004) to 101 312 €/MW (in the case of a wind farm commissioned in 
2013). In addition, a tender procedure will cover new installations where bidders will 
specify a series of retributive parameters (including, among others, the life span of the 
project, number of equivalent hours and lower/upper limits of electricity prices). These 
would be employed to determine the bidding variable: the reduction percentage over 
the standard value of the initial investment for the reference installation. Once the 
winner of the tender is selected, the remuneration for investment will be calculated 
according to the procedure set in the Royal Decree 413/2014 [44]. 
                                                        
 
6 The study is focused on the promotion of large scale wind power. For this reason policies aimed at 
wind installations smaller than 5 MW are not featured in detail. 
7 Although theoretically in use, in practice tenders are not used in Hungary, were deployment is null. 
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Table 2: Summary of FiTs for 2014 for onshore wind energy support implemented in 
MSs. 
 
A new model was recently introduced in the United Kingdom: a FiT with contracts for 
difference (CfD) with regards the market price. Under this scheme wind generators will 
receive the previously defined-by-auction strike price (in practice, a FiT fixed by 
auction). Generators are required to participate in the market and, if the market price 
is lower than the strike price, the difference is covered by the CfD counterparty, i.e. the 
                                                        
 
8 Degression confirmed for new wind farms installed in 2015, this amount can be annually adjusted to 
reflect the evolution in the cost of technology 
9 Exchange rate used: 1 EUR = 1.96 BGN 
10 To be set every year by the regulatory authority 
11 The last 30 MW under this FiT are pending construction. Afterwards the FiT will be stopped. 
12 An extension of the initial period is granted depending on the wind resource at the wind farm 
location related to a reference value (mean wind speed: 5.5 m/s at 30 m with roughness length 0.1 m). 
13 Depending on added capacity 
14 Wind farms above 5 MW. 82 €/MWh for wind farms in the interconnected grid (105 €/MWh if no 
capital grant was received); in not interconnected islands: 90 €/MWh (110 €/MWh if no capital grant 
was received) 
15 For wind farms with more than 5MW 
16 Related to inflation 
17 Wind farms above 5 MW have to bid in a tender with a maximum of 127 €/MWh. Developer PTL 
Energia reported (7/10/2014) being building wind farm Torre di Ruggiero for a tendered FiT of 109.83 
€/MWh. On 17/09/2014 it reported it was awarded, at the last GSE competitive auction, a FiT of 88.9 
€/MWh for a 33MW wind farm to be built in Simeri Crichi. 
18 Annual maximum installed capacity (by registration and by tender) of 710 MW for 2014 and 2015 
19 Maximum amount for wind farms bigger that 350 kW: FiT selected by tender 
20 Maximum installed capacity till 2020 of 500 MW 
21 The feed in tariff is guaranteed for the first three years. After this period, a reduction can be applied 
for new wind farms. Wind power plants with less than 15 MW receive a surcharge 
22 This is the so-called Strike Price. Exchange rate used 1 EUR = 0.807 GBP 





Austria 93.6 13 1%8 
Bulgaria 95.55 BGN/MWh (49 €/MWh)9 12 10 
Croatia Depending on reference price 14 - 
Cyprus 14511 20  
Germany Years 0-5: 89; years 6-20: 49.512 20 13 
Greece 82-90; 10514 20 - 
Hungary Tender - defined - - 
Ireland 69.515 15 16 
Italy 127, 110, 8917 20 2% / 18 
Lithuania 6019 12 - / 20 
Luxemburg 92 15  
Slovakia 70.321 15 - 
United Kingdom 95 GBP/MWh 117,67 (€/MWh)22 15 - 
WindValueEU  Part 1: Regulatory Framework 
15 
Low Carbon Contracts Company (LCCC). Conversely, if the market price is higher than 
the strike price, the generator pays back the difference to the LCCC. 
 
2.2. Feed-in premiums for onshore wind power 
An overview of currently available FiP for two Members States is presented in Table 3. 
Both Estonia and Denmark offer a premium on the top of the market price, but 
Denmark set a ceiling to the sum of market price plus premium. A third variant of this 
model was introduced in Spain in 2007 [45] that included a ceiling and a floor in the 
premium remuneration scheme. Thereby, the risk for investors was also mitigated by 
assuring a minimum remuneration in case of low market prices. However, Spain 
suspended this remuneration scheme for new installations in 2012 [37], [46]. 












23 DKK/MWh (3.1 
€/MWh) for 
covering balance 
6600 FLH plus 
5.6MWh/m2 24 
 
Estonia 53.7 - 12 600 GWh/yr 
A variant of the spot market gap method is used in some MSs to determine the 
premium that is based in average prices of the electricity in the wholesale market. For 
example, Finland implements a FiP calculated as the difference between the objective 
remuneration (previously defined) and the average price of electricity in the preceding 
three months. This premium is annually adjusted according to the average price of 
electricity. 
The Netherlands offers a FiP-like remuneration scheme that is technology-neutral and 
structured in six stages depending on the application date of the plant. Table 4 shows 
the corresponding amount depending on the tender stage when the project is 
selected. 
In Finland the costs derived from the support scheme are covered by public funds, but 
in the Netherlands these costs are covered by a rate surcharge taking into account a 
cap for the overall programme (including also subsidies to renewable heat and 
cogeneration) that was set at 3.5 billion EUR in 2014. The available funds are allocated 
to corresponding projects according to a first come, first served basis. 
                                                        
 
23  Considering an exchange rate of 1 EUR = 7.46 DKK. Wind power plants commissioned after 
01/01/2014 receive a maximum remuneration (premium plus market price) of 80 €/MWh 
24 The wind farm will receive the FiP for a number of hours resulting from the sum of two concepts: 
6600 equivalent full load hours plus 5.6 MWh per each square metre of rotor area. 
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Table 4. Feed-in premium tariff received in the Netherlands related to the application 
date. In parenthesis the maximum of full-hours equivalent is indicated. 






























Germany's 25  FiP takes into account the FiT as reference remuneration. Thus, the 
premium is calculated as this reference remuneration minus the average electricity 
price during the previous month. Also Slovenia applies a variant of this scheme where 
the premium is calculated as the reference value minus the average price multiplied 
by a certain factor. 
Table 5: Summary of FiPs – Spot Gap Market model- for 2014 for wind energy 
support implemented in MSs. 




Finland 83.5 26, 12 
Maximum installed 
capacity: 2.5 GW 




20 3500 eq. hours 
The 
Netherlands 
S1: 87.5; S2: 100 
S3: 112.5; S4-S6: 121.329, 
15 
S1 & S2: 2960 h 
S3: 2520 h; S4-S6: 2320 h 
                                                        
 
25 Germany offers the possibility of choosing between FiT and FiP 
26 Target price. The subsidised amount is the difference between the target price and the average market 
price during the previous three months with a minimum of 30 €/MWh if the average market price drops 
below that figure. The subsidy is covered by the state budget. An early-bird premium is considered for 
wind farms installed before 31/12/2015 with a target price of 105.3 €/MWh for the three first years. 
27 Calculated as the FiT minus technology-weighted average monthly market price. Already-installed 
generators under the old remuneration scheme can switch from FiP to FiT and vice versa on a monthly 
basis. New generators have only access to FiP 
28 Exchange rate used 1 EUR = 0.70 LVL. Selected by tender. The tariff is reduced by 40 % in years 11-
20. The FiT system is currently under review. The subsidy amount was chosen by a competitive bidding 
process. However, the mechanism to choose winners was claimed to be non-transparent.  
29 Each stage ("S") of remuneration is opened successively and each lasts around 6 weeks. If a plant 
applies for the lowest level (S1), it is most likely that there are funds and thus it can get this level of 
remuneration. The later the plant applies, the more remuneration is entitled, but there might not be any 
funding left from the previous stage. In addition, there is an annual overall cap on maximum expenditure 
in support for all renewable energy sources of 3.5 € billion 
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2.3. Tradable green certificates and quota obligation for onshore 
wind power 
Belgium, Sweden, Poland, Romania and United Kingdom apply TGCs and quotas to 
promote wind energy. Table 6 summarises the main features and particularities in each 
case. 
In Belgium, support to onshore wind is the responsibility of the regions, and thus the 
basis to issue one certificate change depending on the jurisdiction. For example, 
1 MWh is the basis used in the Flemish region, as in Sweden and Poland. In the United 
Kingdom, one certificate is issued for each 1.11 MWh of energy produced by an 
onshore wind farm. A different approach is applied in the Belgian regions of Wallonia 
and Brussels by issuing the green certificates indexed to the amount of CO2 saved. 
 















217 kg of 
CO2 
100 65 - 5  
Belgium 
(Wallonia) 
456 kg of 
CO231 
100 65 - 5 10+532 
Belgium 
(Flanders) 
1 MWh 100 93 -  15 




- -   
Romania 











                                                        
 
30 Reference prices to calculate the premium as the reference price minus the average electricity market 
price multiplied by a factor, B (0.8 up to 10 MW and 0.86 up to 50 MW). 
31 For wind energy, the amount of green certificate is calculated on a case-by-case basis 
32 A reduced coefficient is applied after 10 years 
33 150 % of average price of unsatisfied obligation period 
34 15 years (in any case, eligibility will cease at the end of 2035 at the latest) 
35 Exchange rate used 1 EUR = 4.17 PNL 
36 Considering an exchange rate of 1 EUR = 4.41 RON 














UK 37 38    20 
In Romania, two certificates per MWh are issued for wind farms accredited before 31 
December 2013, but from these, one certificate is suspended until 31 March 2017. 
From 2018, one certificate is issued per MWh. In case of onshore wind farms registered 
after 31 December 2013, 1.5 certificates per MWh are issued till 2017 and 0.75 
certificates per MWh from 2018. The penalty for missing a certificate ranges from 72.9 
€ in Poland [47] to 119.3 € in Romania. In the United Kingdom, the penalty is calculated 
as a function of the buy-out price during the period of the missing certificate plus 
interest. 
Another distinguishing factor is the different level of demand stimulation by setting 
the quota of renewable energy that has to be consumed by the required customers. 
Most MSs that apply TGCs have published their quotas for the following years, see 
Figure 2. As it can be appreciated, the required quota varies significantly among MSs. 
As a consequence of this, pressure put over the demand is expected to be at a different 
level. 
 
                                                        
 
37 Variable depending on year and technology 
38 Buy-out price plus five per cent interest 
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Poland, Romania and the Belgian region of Wallonia have defined an increasing trend 
of the quota. On the other hand, Northern Ireland and Great Britain39 set a decreasing 
trend in the following few years that finally will remain at a constant value after 31 
March 2015 until the mechanism closes in 2017. Sweden defined an increasing quota 
phase till 2020 and a decreasing phase from 2020 to 2035. 
The average annual price in each country is shown in Figure 3. As it can be appreciated, 
the prices of certificates are relatively stable for each MS. Romania [48]; Great Britain 
[49] and Poland [50] have reached similar prices. Whilst much higher prices were 
obtained in Flanders and Wallonia [51] and lower prices observed in Sweden [52] 40. 
Quotas combined with TGCs system is a support scheme that is increasingly losing 
ground. Two MS —the United Kingdom and Poland— are planning to phase out this 
support mechanism [53]. More specifically, the UK has announced the expiration of 
the quota system on 31 March 2017 [37], to be replaced with a contract for difference 
(CfD) that entered in force in October 2014 in Great Britain. During a transition period, 
owners can choose between both support schemes. 
Also, some other MSs that used to apply TGCs, eventually switched to a different 
support scheme as was the case of the Netherlands that phased out this system in 
2000 [54] or Italy who in 2013, switched TGCs for a FiT [55]. 
 
                                                        
 
39 Great Britain and Northern Ireland set a different amount of quota obligation 
40 Yearly average currency exchange rates where used to convert SEK, RON, GBP and PLN to EUR. 
 
Figure 3: Evolution of yearly average price of TGCs. 
WindValueEU  Part 1: Regulatory Framework 
20 
2.4. Suspension of support schemes and retrospective measures 
There are some Members States that, for different reasons, currently do not provide 
any of the main support schemes (FiTs, premiums or TGCs). In one case (Malta), the 
MS never provided support for large-scale wind energy; in other cases, support was 
provided in the past and later stopped. 
Cyprus stopped wind energy support for new projects with the exception of a 30MW 
ongoing development. In France, following a ruling issued by the European Court of 
Justice, the conditions for the purchase of electricity produced by wind power plants 
were abolished on 28 May 2014. The old regulation applied exemptions to certain 
industries from the surcharge, Contribution au Service Public de l'Electricité, which was 
found to be against EU state aid regulations. 
In January 2012, Spain suspended the existing support schemes after having 
introduced previously several retroactive changes. The price regulation system was 
eventually phased out through Real Decreto-ley 9/2013. A new remuneration scheme 
entered into force in June 2014 [44]. Additionally, a series of retrospective measures 
have been put into force in recent years affecting the income of renewable energy 
producers: modification of the reward system for reactive power control, annual cap 
of equivalent production hours and a 7% flat rate tax applied on the gross revenues 
for electricity sale [56]. 
In October 2014, a new policy for renewable energy support was published in Portugal. 
This new policy does not consider any support for large scale projects, just for micro- 
and mini-generation. Portugal had stopped supporting new installations in 2012 and 
negotiated a levy on existing wind producers to do away with their situation of 
overcompensation (in contrast with Spain that did not negotiate at all with 
stakeholders).  
In August 2013, the Czech Republic abolished the FiT scheme for all renewable 
technologies except for small hydro. However, wind power plants that obtained 
approval of their building permits before 31 December 2013 will be entitled for 
support if they are put into operation before 31 December 2015 [37]. 
 
Additionally, several MSs introduced retrospective measures [57]: 
 In Wallonia (Belgium), some municipalities are adopting special taxes over new 
and existing wind turbines [58]. Also in Wallonia, a specific fee for green 
electricity producers has been introduced in mid-2012. 
 In Bulgaria, since May 2012, the connection to the grid of renewable plants with 
a preliminary grid connection contract was postponed to 2016. Furthermore, 
since mid-March 2014, the distribution system companies have been limiting 
the maximum power generation of all wind and photovoltaic power plants by 
60% [56]. 
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 Greece imposed in 2012 a levy on the gross income of all operating RES 
projects. 
 The Polish indexing of green certificate prices to inflation was removed [56]. 
 Romania introduced in 2013 retroactive regulatory changes that fundamentally 
changed the economics for existing installations. Mandatory acquisition quotas 
for green certificates -which were defined by law till 2020- were slashed 
drastically (in 2014, the quota reductions were over 25%, as the obligation was 
reduced from 15% to 11.1%); energy-intensive companies where exempted 
largely without redistribution of the obligations; the validity of green certificates 
was reduced from 16 months to 12 months; the envisaged implementation of 
the guaranty fund, that should have bought excess green certificates, was 
repealed. All these measures resulted in green certificate prices being cut by 
half and caused extreme oversupply which may result in many green certificates 
to expire and therefore be worthless. Furthermore, half of the green certificates 
produced between 2013 and 2017 were delayed to the period of 2018 and 2020, 
which causes financial losses even if a recovery would be possible. Green 
certificates are not granted anymore for electricity produced above the physical 
notifications of the day-ahead forecast. New priority dispatch of certain national 
coal generation and changes to balancing market rules led to additional, non-
remunerated, production curtailment. Finally, a construction tax of 1.5% yearly 
on tangible assets was introduced. 
 
2.5. Secondary support schemes 
Other types of incentive programmes such as tax exemptions, investment grants or 
financing support can complement the main wind energy support schemes. 
2.5.1. Tax incentives or exemptions  
Tax incentives or exemptions are considered to be highly flexible policy tools that are 
targeted to encourage specific renewable energy technologies, especially when used 
in combination with other policy instruments [59].  




VAT relief on 
WF CapEx 
Other tax reliefs 
VAT relief on 
energy sales 
Greece 
100 % of CapEx 
be deducted 
from income 
- - - 
Ireland 
50 % of CapEx 
(excl. land cost) 
up to 9.5 M€ 
- - - 





VAT relief on 
WF CapEx 
Other tax reliefs 
VAT relief on 
energy sales 
Italy - 
10 % (instead 
of 20 %) 
- - 












Max. 600€ per 
installed kW41 
- 





Sweden - - 
Reduced real estate 
tax (0.2 €/MWh for 
wind energy) 
Exemption of energy 
tax42 
- 
Slovakia - - 




Table 7 shows that these incentives or exemptions are offered on different types of 
taxes. Namely, value-added tax on CapEx; income tax relief (as in Greece and Ireland); 
special tax exemptions (applied in Sweden and United Kingdom); reduced taxes for 
renewable energy consumers (Lithuania and Poland) or — as in case of the 
Netherlands — stimulation of participating in renewable energy projects by deducting 
taxes paid by investors. 
 
2.5.2. Investment grants 
Investments grants are implemented by several MSs. For example, in Belgium Flanders 
offers a subsidy programme for selected wind projects (but this programme cannot be 
combined with participation in the TGCs market) and Wallonia applies investment 
grants for wind projects larger than 1 MW. Finland, Greece, Romania and Slovenia offer 
                                                        
 
41 For entrepreneurs based in the Netherlands 
42 Just for self-consumption 
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support that may reach 30-50 % of the project. A higher percentage can be granted in 
Lithuania up to 80 % of the capital expenditure with a maximum of 0.2 M€ per project. 
Table 8: Summary of investment grants for wind energy available in MSs 
Country Target Conditions 
Belgium 
(Wallonia) 
Projects larger than 1 
MW 
Minimum assistance 25 000 € 
For small companies up to 50 % with 
1.5 M€ maximum. Big companies up to 




Depending on the environmental 
performance of the project with a 
maximum of 1 M€ over a period of 3 
years. No compatible with TGCs 
Estonia 
Wind projects in 
general 
Variable. Depending on the scope of 
the project 
Finland 
Wind projects in 
general 
Up to 30 % of overall cost 
Greece 
Wind projects in 
general 
Between 15 - 45 % of total cost 
15-40% in case of wind farms larger 
than 1 MW 
Lithuania 
Wind projects in 
general 
Up to 200 000 € or 80 % of the overall 
cost 
Romania 
Wind projects in 
general 
Up to 6.7 M€ or 50 % of total cost  
(40 % in the zone of Bucharest) 
Slovenia Selected by tendering Maximum 30-50 % 
2.5.3. Low-interest loans 
This category of support scheme seeks to assist on financing renewable projects by 
promoting or offering loans with a rate below the market rate of interest. This kind of 
support can also provide longer payment periods or phases without interest payment. 
As it can be observed in Table 9 both Germany and Lithuania offer loans for onshore 
wind power. 
 
Table 9: Summary of loans for wind energy available in MSs 
Country Target Loan conditions 
Lithuania 
Wind energy in 
general 
Non-established upper limit. The credit institution 
will provide at least 20 % of the loan 
WindValueEU  Part 1: Regulatory Framework 
24 





Depending on the programme: projects up to 25 
M€, 100 % of financing; between 25 and 100 M€, 50 
% of financing. Repayment-free start-up period of 
maximum 3 years. Low interest loan up to 20 years. 
Monthly commitment fee of 0.25 % 
 
 
2.6. Grid issues 
This section presents grid issues regarding grid connection (procedure and cost 
allocation) and operation (priority use of the grid and balancing). 
2.6.1. Connection procedure 
The general procedure 
for grid connection in 
most European countries 
is basically as shown in 
Figure 4 [60]. After 
performing the basic 
technical project of the 
wind farm, the plant 
developer sends the 
application to the system 
operator. In a feasibility 
study, the system 
operator examines 
whether the network 
conditions existing at the 
planned point of 
connection are 
technically adequate. If 
the technical 
requirements of the 
electrical system at the 
intended connection 
point are not adequate, 
the grid operator 
furnishes evidence of this inadequacy and proposes the necessary modifications or 
network reinforcements. Following this feasibility study, a formal connection offer is 
proposed. 
Wind farm basic 
technical project








Connection & access 
contract









Figure 4: General connection procedure for wind power plants 
[60] 
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In some counties renewable energy sources are entitled to priority connection over 
conventional sources as long as they meet the technical requirements and the terms 
and conditions for connection. As shown in Figure 5, priority connection is offered in 
10 MS whereas in the rest connection is non-discriminatory between technologies. 
 
2.6.2. Connection costs sharing 
The allocation of grid connection costs impacts renewable energy schemes more than 
conventional generators because renewable energy projects are more sensitive to any 
increase in capital costs [19].  
As shown in Figure 6, there are different approaches for sharing costs of grid 
connection between producers and grid operators [63]: 
 Shallow cost 
approach. The plant 
developer bears the 
cost of equipment 
necessary to connect 
the generator to the 
nearest suitable point 
on the already 
existing grid network, 
generally a 
substation. On the 
other hand, the grid 
owner will bear the 
cost of any grid 
reinforcement that 
would be necessary 
to integrate the new 
generator. Usually, 
these costs are eventually transferred to the end users by specific tariffs or 
surcharges. The major advantage of this approach is a relatively cheap connection 
cost for the plant developer. However, the main drawback is that the grid operator 
may overestimate the reinforcement costs, knowing that these costs will be 
transferred to the ratepayers. 
 Super–shallow approach: plant developers only have to bear the costs of the 
internal electrical infrastructure including the plant substation. Expansion of the 
grid to the connection point and reinforcement is borne by the grid operator. 




Figure 5: Connection regime for renewable energy sources in MSs [37], [61], [62]. 
AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK
Priority connection 
Non-discriminatory
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 Deep cost approach: plant developers have to bear all connection costs, as well as 
any further reinforcement expenses that can arise as a consequence of integrating 
the generator in the electrical system. This model has two main drawbacks from 
the developer's point of view: (i) the costs borne by the generator are potentially 
much higher than by the shallow approach and (ii) project risks increase because 
developers face additional uncertainty regarding network reinforcement costs. 
 Mixed shallow-deep approach: this model is a hybrid of the two above-mentioned 
methodologies. Mainly, the plant developer bears the cost of the grid extension 
to the assigned connection point, plus a proportion of the reinforcement costs. 
The main drawback of this approach is the difficulty of defining the exact 
proportion corresponding to each party. Incidentally, by offering tailored 
connection charges this method can be used to stimulate/discourage the 
installation of new generators in the locations more/less suitable from a system 
point of view. 
Table 10 shows that the shallow approach is the most implemented among MSs. A 
variant of the shallow cost approach is offered in Denmark: the costs of connection to 
be borne by the plant developer are limited to the equivalent costs of connecting the 
generator to the medium voltage grid [37]. In Germany, if the system operator defines 
a connection point different than to the closest one, the grid operator bears the 
additional costs. Lithuania applies a deep-shallow approach, being the plant developer 
responsible for 10 % of the cost of grid reinforcement. 
 
WindValueEU  Part 1: Regulatory Framework 
27 
 
Table 10. Distribution of the connection costs and reinforcement between plant and 
system operators (PD: Plant Developer; GO: Grid Operator) [37], [65] 
 Connection Reinforcement Approach Comments 
 GO PD GO PD   
AT  x  x Deep  
BE  x x  Shallow Offshore connection costs partially subsidised 
BG x  x  Shallow  
CY  x  x Deep  
CZ  x  x Deep  
DE  x x  Shallow 
Plant developer bears cost to closest 
connection point. If grid operator requires a 
different point of connection, grid operator 
bears the additional costs 
DK x x x  Shallow 
Plant developer bears a cost equivalent to the 
costs that would be incurred if his plant was 
connected to the medium voltage grid. The 
remainder is borne by the grid operator 
EE  x  x Deep 
Reported lack of regulation regarding 
responsibilities of grid reinforcement 
ES  x x  Shallow  
FI  x  x Deep 
No clear rules: grid reinforcement borne by 
plant developer if it is for the only benefit of 
the plant 
FR  x x  Shallow  
GR  x  x Shallow  
HR  x  x Deep  
HU  x x  Shallow  
IE  x x  Shallow  
IT  x x  Shallow  
LT  x x x 
Deep-
shallow 
Plant operators contribute with no more than 
10 % of the costs of reinforcement 
LU  x  x Deep  
LV  x  x Deep  
MT  X  x Deep  
NL  x x  Shallow Hyper-shallow for new offshore WF. 
PL  x x  Shallow 
Despite grid operator being responsible for 
upgrading the network, rules are not clear 
PT  x x  Shallow  
RO  x x  Shallow  
SE  x  x Deep 
Grid reinforcement borne by plant developer if 
it is for the benefit of the plant only 
SI  x x  Shallow  
SK  x x x 
Deep-
Shallow 
Costs of reinforcement are shared between 
plant and system operators 
UK  x  x 
Deep-
Shallow 
Plant operators pay the Connection Charges to 
grid operators distributed over time1 
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2.6.3. Operation and use of the grid by wind energy generators 
The wind generator's revenue is linked to the volume of energy sold. In this sense, 
there are two main aspects of the use and operation of the grid that can mitigate the 
volume risk: priority of access to the grid and beneficial curtailment rules. It should be 
noted that the operational issues presented in these sections are applicable for both 
onshore and offshore wind energy. 
Some MSs establish conditions for priority access to the grid by renewable installations 
by either the priority access (in presence of purchase contracts with transmission 
operators) or guaranteed access (when the wind generators participate in the market). 
Figure 7 shows those countries that offer either kind of preferential access for the 
transmission of energy produced by renewable energy sources. 
Despite priority use of the grid being granted in most MSs, energy curtailment can 
occasionally happen under certain operational conditions of the grid. A problem is that 
in some countries there is a lack of curtailment and compensation rules. Furthermore 
as wind energy penetration levels rise and the electricity grid is not developed and 
reinforced at the same time, an increase in energy curtailment can be expected in the 
future. Energy curtailment, as a potential barrier for wind energy deployment, is 
presented in more detail in section 2.7 below. 
 Balancing Responsibility 
Figure 8 shows that in some MSs, wind operators are required to cover balancing 
responsibilities. Nevertheless, the ability of wind generators to participate in this 
process is linked to the design of the market. Mature intraday markets, with a proper 
level of liquidity, allow wind generators to better react to market signals [66], since 
wind production forecast errors decrease with short lead-times. 
The new Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy 2014-2020 
[67] introduce the obligation for large renewable energy systems (RES) to be subject 
to balancing obligations on the conditions that liquid balancing markets exist. 
Currently, there are different levels of required balancing responsibility between the 
MSs that require participation on balancing. In Germany, no responsibility is allocated 
under the FiT scheme; however, generators under the premium option are fully 
responsible for balancing. Hungary and Latvia make RES generators pay balancing 
 
Figure 8: Balancing responsibility for wind electricity producers in MS. 





Figure 7: Priority/guaranteed access to the grid for energy produced by renewable 
sources. 
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penalties that, in the latter case, can reach 20% of the Fit. In Italy, a positive incentive 
for meeting the forecasts is granted. 
2.7. Barriers 
This section aims to give an overview of potential barriers to onshore wind energy 
deployment among MSs. 
The effectiveness of support mechanisms is not just related to the remuneration 
provided: other drivers and factors such as the political and economic framework, the 
structure and regulation of the market, the infrastructure and regulation of the grid, as 
well as the administrative and permitting process, have a considerable influence on 
the diffusion of renewable energy technologies. Figure 9 shows the impact of each one 
of these categories according to the preliminary results obtained by the DiaCore 
project [68]. The box-plots show the results of the interviews and questionnaires 
performed on renewable energy stakeholders in Europe. As can be seen, the political 
and economic framework is the most relevant factor with a median of 9 points of 
relevance scoring (over a maximum of 10 points). According to the results, market and 
grid structure have a lower relevance, with a median of 8 points and, finally, the 
administrative process with 7 points is considered as the less relevant factor. These 
results are in concordance with the study performed by Lüthi and Prässler [69], which 
concluded that project developers rank regulatory security as the most important 
barrier, remuneration as second and administrative process duration as third. 
Each one of the above-mentioned main barrier types can be divided into several 
subcategories: 
 Political and economic framework: revenue risk under the support schemes, 


























Figure 9: Relevance of the main categories of possible barriers to RE diffusion [68]. 
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 Grid regulation and infrastructure: cost of access to the grid, duration of the 
connection period, transparency of the procedure, curtailment and grid 
development. 
 Market structure: fair and independent regulation of the wind energy sector, 
existence of functioning, non-discriminatory, short-term markets, availability of 
long-term contracts and enough market competition and volume. 
 Administrative process: complexity, spatial and environmental planning, cost of 
administrative procedure and duration of the procedure. 
 Other: operational issues, public perception, communication between relevant 
stakeholders and taxes. 
It should be noted that, despite some specific barriers affecting in different ways 
onshore and offshore wind energy, the results presented in this section are common 
for both onshore and offshore wind. 
2.7.1. Political and economic framework 
According to the results of the survey performed by the DiaCore project, the most 
important factor, in regard to political and economic framework, is the reliability of the 
regulatory framework, followed by the remuneration level, risk under the given 
support scheme (with similar rating) and access to finance (rated as the less important 
barrier). 
Figure 10 shows the barriers identified in the interactive database, RE-frame [70]. This 
online tool allows users to insert new barriers, as well as to see and comment on the 
already existing barriers. The barriers reported by the stakeholders in this database 
have been employed by the Keep on Track! project in the report Analysis of Deviations 
and Barriers 2013/2014 [71]. 
The dominant category is the reliability of the regulatory-framework barrier that has 
been reported in 17 MSs. Introduction of new levies and taxes (as in the case of 
Bulgaria, Greece, Latvia, Portugal and Spain), as well as continuous changes, are the 
main issues featured under this category. A subsequent issue of the lack of reliability 
is the difficult access to financing in those markets that do not offer enough regulatory 
security (this barrier has been reported in 11 MSs, with different levels of severity). 
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Revenue risk
Remmuneration level
Reliability of regulatory framework
Access to finance
Figure 10: Reported barriers regarding political and economic framework in MS (based in 
[70]). 
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2.7.2. Grid regulation and infrastructure 
Figure 11 summarizes the potential barriers identified that relate to grid regulation 
and infrastructure. Cost of grid access has been reported as a barrier in the 8 MSs that 
adopted a non-shallow cost model for grid connection. 
Long duration of the connection process is mainly caused by complex or inefficient 
procedures involving a large number of administrations or too many steps, as well as 
the presence of (connection) demand saturation and non-homogenous procedures 
for grid connection [65]. The following procedural issues have been highlighted: 
 In Finland, a large number of grid operators exists with significantly different 
procedures. 
 In Bulgaria, a moratorium for renewable energy grid connection entered into 
force in 2010. 
 In Poland, developers have to provide advance payments for the grid 
connection concession. They claim that such payment leaves them in a weak 
position when negotiating the connection conditions. Also, advanced payments 
can be a barrier for small players with lower financial resources. However, these 
payments might be necessary to avoid "free riders" from taking over grid 
connection points thus blocking the access of real developers. 
 In Slovakia, developers complain about a moratorium for the connection of new 
renewable installations applied by the distribution system operators. 
Energy curtailment normally involves a reduction of prospective income with or 
without compensation. Curtailment is the requirement to reduce or stop wind 
electricity production because of certain operational conditions, and it has been 
reported in 13 MSs. Furthermore, in 7 MSs (Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Poland, 
Portugal and Slovenia) curtailment conditions are not defined by regulation, and in 3 
MSs (Italy, Poland and Portugal), compensation is not provided in case of energy 
curtailment. In Belgium, the conditions for curtailment are decided during the permit 
process so that compensation can be offered or not depending on the distribution 
system operator. In Germany, curtailment may not be compensated depending on the 
operating circumstances. Plant operators state that in case of non-compensated 
curtailment, the system operators are in a strong position, since it is difficult to 
question the grid operating decisions. 
Grid development is a common barrier hindering further wind deployment. Usually, 
the growth rate of installed renewable sources is higher than the rate of development 
or reinforcement of the electricity grid. This problem is compounded when wind farms 
are located far from consumption centres (as is the case in countries such as Finland, 
Greece, the UK and Italy). 
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2.7.3. Administrative procedure 
Complexity of procedures and long duration of the licensing process are the main 
administrative issues, as depicted for each MS in Figure 12. According to the results 
obtained by the Wind Barriers project [60], the total time required to obtain the 
building permit can vary significantly from one country to another from 2 to 154 
months. Duration of the permitting process is mainly related with the approval and 
scope of the Environmental Impact Assessment, compliance with spatial planning and 
the number of authorities to contact. In some cases, radar issues (both military and 
civilian) can further complicate the situation. 
The following administrative issues are highlighted in the RE-frame database: 
 In Flanders, developers state that a construction permit can be refused for 
environmental reasons, even in the case where an environmental permit has 
been previously granted. In Wallonia, some projects with permits already 
granted are sued due noise rules, facing judicial uncertainty and possible delays. 
 In France, stakeholders reported that the high number of appeal proceedings 
(between 3 and 6 legal permits are required) can be a major barrier, and a 
similar problem is reported in Greece with a high number of appeals against 
wind projects. 
 In Romania, developers complain about non-harmonised administrative 
procedures, since environmental authorisations and construction licenses can 
vary significantly between different regions. 
 Interference with radars is a generalised issue among MSs. This barrier has been 
reported in: Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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Figure 11: Reported barriers regarding grid regulation and infrastructure in MS (compiled 
from [60], [65] and [70]). 
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Complexity of administrative procedure
Spatial and environmental planning
Cost of administrative procedure
Duration of administrative procedure
Figure 12: Reported barriers regarding administrative process in MSs (compiled from [65], 
[70]). 
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2.7.4. Market design 
As renewable energy generators become significant players in the energy markets, 
higher participation in the electricity and balancing markets is required to encourage 
overall system cost effectiveness and to steer efficient investment decisions. However, 
when operators are exposed to non-competitive balancing prices, only a proper design 
of the electricity market may avoid unduly penalisation. Thus, trading close to real-
time is particularly important since generation forecasts significantly improve closer to 
production time. In this sense, the existence of intra-day markets is necessary in order 
to minimize the cost of balancing for wind generators and reduce support needs. 
Market concentration in the hands of incumbents is another important factor, for both 
wholesale and balancing markets, which can create conditions of unfair 
competitiveness for wind generators. 
Table 11 shows the indicators of concentration level in electricity markets reported by 
Eurostat for the year 2012 [72]. Other than Malta and Cyprus, where one company 
produces all electricity, the highest concentration corresponds to Latvia (89.0 %), 
Estonia (88.0 %), France (86.0 %), Croatia (82.0 %) and Luxembourg (81.8 %). 
Table 11. Indicators of electricity market concentration in EU MSs 
 AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HR HU 
I1 57 66  100 68  37 88 24 25 86 77 82 47 
I2 145 46 28 1 73 >450 ~1300 5  30 >5  2 32 
I3 4 2 5 1 1 4 2 1 4 4 1 3 2 4 
 IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK 
I1 55 26 30 82 89 100  16 37 27 44 55 79 52 
I2 5 291 17 4 17 1 800 111 112 11 74 3 11 17 
I3 5 3 6 2 1 1 4 4 4 5 3 2 1 7 
I1: Market share of the largest generation company 
I2: Number of companies generating 95% of national production or more 
I3: Number of big companies (representing each more than 5 % of total) 
 
2.7.5. Other potential barriers 
Besides the above-mentioned issues, there are also a number of other potential 
barriers for wind development. Particularly, public perception is a generalised issue in 
Europe for large infrastructure projects (as shown in Figure 14, specifically for wind 
energy, this barrier is present in 13 MSs). The lack of public awareness about the 
benefits of wind energy and the perception as an expensive technology may cause 
resistance to a wider wind deployment. Public opposition and a strong position of anti-
 
Figure 13: Reported market design and structure barriers in MS (compiled from [70], [65]). 
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wind lobbies can hinder public willingness for further wind deployment, as well as 
increase the number of legal processes against wind projects. 
Lack of information between relevant stakeholders (namely project developers, 
administration, regulators and grid operators) has also an influence over wind 
development. This lack of information exchange has been reported in 8 MSs. 
Finally, in some countries, plant operators complained about tax regimes 
discriminatory for wind generation. As an example, in France the so-called IFER tax is 
paid by all electricity producers, but the amount is higher for wind plants than for 
conventional energy sources. In Romania, a new tax was created for renewable energy 
producers consisting of 1.5 % on the value of the equipment. In Spain, taxes at 
municipal level for wind generators have increased and there are other imposed taxes 
that are not homogenous at a national level (a new levy in several regions applies only 
to wind generators). Finally, also in Spain, a 7% tax was introduced in 2013 for all 
generation technologies. However, whereas renewables cannot pass on the cost of the 
tax because it is imposed on revenue from the FiT, conventional generators can 
increase their bids in the wholesale market by the new extra expense, and thus pass 
on the tax cost onto consumers. 




Figure 14: Other potential barriers to wind power deployment (compiled from [70], [65]). 
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3. Overview and analysis of the regulatory framework for 
offshore wind energy. 
Most aspects of the regulatory framework, including grid operation issues and barriers, 
cover both onshore and offshore wind, and they have been presented in the previous 
section. Therefore, this chapter presents a brief overview and analysis of the differences 
for offshore wind energy, e.g. in the permitting and connection procedures. 
Figure 15 shows an overview of the evolution of support schemes for offshore wind 
energy in Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Germany (DE), the Netherlands (NL) and the 
United Kingdom (UK). As offshore wind is a less mature technology, it is projected that 
it will achieve a high cost reduction by applying technological improvements under 
economies of scale. Due to this reason, some MSs implemented specific support 
schemes or adapted the remuneration level, such as Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. France offers a FiT for offshore wind farms 
with an agreement of purchase before 28 May 2014, but actual support to offshore 
wind farms is currently available under a tendering scheme. 










107 €/MWh (0-216 MW) 
90 €/MWh (>216 MW) 
- 5 20 
Offshore wind development in Belgium depends on the federal government, which 
offers the TGC support scheme. The minimum price of green certificates for an offshore 
wind power plant is 107 € for the first 216 MW and 90 € for capacity exceeding this 
amount [73]. However, as long as there is no certificate market for offshore [62], 
producers receive the minimum guaranteed price for certificates that are financed by 
a surcharge in electricity bills. Also, additional aid is provided in Belgium by financing 
the connection costs with a maximum of 25 M€ per project. 
Figure 15: Evolution of support schemes for offshore wind energy in BE, DK, DE, NL and UK. 
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As shown later in Section 4, in Denmark, the FiP is selected based on one of two 
approaches: 
 Calls for tender. Denmark set up the FiP for each project through auctions. As a 
result, a FiP of 69.5 €/MWh was granted for the Horns Rev 2 wind farm 
(commissioned in 2009), 84.4 €/MWh for Rødsand 2 (2010) and 140.7 €/MWh in 
the case of the Anholt wind farm (2013). Furthermore, the tender for Horns Rev 3 
(400 MW) was recently granted at 103.1 €/MWh and another auction, for Kriegers 
Flak (600 MW), will follow next year. In all cases the FiT is paid for the first 50 000 
FLH of operation, between 11 and 12 years of normal operations. 
 Open-door procedure. Offshore wind farms under the FiP scheme commissioned 
after February 2008 receive a premium of 30 €/MWh for 22 000 equivalent full 
hours plus 3 €/MWh for covering the balancing costs. Also, in coastal projects, a 20 
% share of the ownership of the project has to be offered to local residents or 
companies [73]. If this share achieves 30 %, an extra bonus of 1.3 €/MWh can be 
awarded over the FiP [37]. In the same sense, guarantees for loans taken out by 
local owners are provided by the Danish transmission system operator, 
Energinet.dk. 
In Italy, the fare to be received during 25 years is determined by a tendering scheme 
with a base price for offshore projects of 165 €/MWh. In order to be admitted to the 
tender process, bidders have to offer a reduction over the base price between 2-30 %. 
No commercial offshore wind farm exists yet in Italy. 
In the Netherlands, offshore wind farms can apply for the subsidy under the SDE+ 
programme. The specific rates and phases for offshore wind farms are the same as 
shown in Table 4 (except for Stages 4 to 6, for which the rates are, respectively, 137.5 
€/MWh, 162.5 €/MWh and 187.5 €/MWh). The subsidy is granted for a period of 15 
years and a maximum of 3000 equivalent hours each year. 
Under this process, offshore wind energy competes with all other technologies 
covered by the SDE+ scheme by taking into account a ceiling of 3.5 b€ for the entire 
programme for 2014. Nevertheless, a new specific scheme for offshore wind was 
announced by the Dutch Government on 26 September 2014. Under this scheme, the 
Table 13. Summary of specific regulatory frameworks for offshore wind energy. 
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successful applicant is selected by a competitive bidding process exclusive to offshore. 
The new bill is expected to enter into force on 1 July 2015 [74]. Dutch offshore projects 
have also gained already preferential loan conditions from the Economisch Instituut 
voor de Bouw. Finally, offshore wind farms are entitled to write off investments against 
tax with a maximum investment of 1000 €/kW of installed power. 
In the United Kingdom, offshore wind farms are eligible to support via its TGC 
("Renewables Obligation") and in the new CfD. Two certificates are issued per MWh 
(i.e. 0.5 MWh/certificate) generated by an offshore wind farm, which will be modified 
in 2015/2016 to 0.53 MWh and finally to 0.55 MWh after 2016. This way, the level of 
support received by offshore wind farms is similar to solar photovoltaic plants (that 
also receive two certificates per each MWh generated) and slightly more than twice as 
much as onshore wind (1.11 certificates per MWh). Regarding additional support, 
offshore wind energy is also exempted of paying the Carbon Price Floor and the 
Climate Change Levy. 
The UK Renewables Obligation will be phased out and replaced by an auction-based 
feed-in tariff structure called “Contract for Differences” (CfD), as mentioned in section 
2.3. 
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4. In-depth analysis of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom offshore wind 
power regulation. 
This section presents in more detail the permitting aspects in the five MSs with the 
highest degree of offshore wind power deployment. The analysis focusses on: 
 Permitting process: maritime spatial planning, authorities involved, applicable 
laws and barriers. 
 Submarine transmission system and grid connection: procedure, cost sharing 
of expansion and grid reinforcement. 
 
4.1. Belgium 
The zone reserved in the Belgian part of the North Sea for offshore wind energy 
exploitation is set by the Royal Decree of 17 May 2004. The designated area covers 
270 km² for a total capacity of 2 000 MW [75]. To develop an offshore wind farm, a 
candidate developer requires [76]:  
 A domain concession (right to occupy a parcel) in the zone reserved for wind 
development: the Law on the organisation of the electricity market stipulates 
the conditions and a specific procedure that must be fulfilled for granting an 
offshore concession. 
 An environmental permit: this procedure has several steps, including a public 
hearing where the public concerned can express their objections. The 
Management Unit of the North Sea Mathematical Models of the Royal Belgian 
Institute of Natural Sciences renders advice on the possible environmental 
impact of the future project to the Minister responsible for the marine 
environment by also taking into account the environmental impact study 
carried out by the project developer. 
 Authorisation for the construction and operation: this is issued by the Ministry 
of the Environment to carry out a specific activity under specified conditions 
and during a given period. 
Furthermore, a monitoring programme to assess the effects of the project on the 
marine environment is imposed once the environmental permit is granted [77]. 
Grid connection 
The offshore grid connection procedure is the competence of the federal authorities. 
The general process is shown in Figure 16, the process is very similar to the onshore 
case [78]. The first step is optional; the plant developer requests an orientation study 
about the estimated costs of connection. Next, the plant developer applies for 
connection to the transmission system operator which will perform a detailed study 
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by proposing the technical solution for the grid connection, and a cost proposal. If the 
applicant accepts, the parties sign a connection agreement. 
The plant developer bears the costs of the grid connection to the onshore substation 
(shallow approach). Nevertheless, these costs are partially subsidised by 33 % of the 
investment up to a maximum of 25 M€. The subsidy is spread over five years (by 
providing 20% each year) and is covered by the transmission system operator. 
 
4.2. Denmark 
In Denmark, the zones designated to offshore wind power exploitation are defined in 
the report Future Offshore Wind Turbine Locations – 2025 [79] published in April 2007 
and last updated in April 2011. Permits are granted by the Danish Energy Agency, 
which acts as a one-stop shop for the project developer. In total 3 licences, granted 
consecutively, are required to establish an offshore wind project: 
1. License to carry out preliminary investigations. 
2. Licence to establish the offshore wind turbines (only given if preliminary 
investigations show that the project is compatible with the relevant interests at 
sea). 
3. Licence to exploit wind power for a given number of years, and an approval for 
electricity production (given that conditions to establish the project are met). 
Two procedures are available to apply for the establishment of an offshore wind farm: 
 Calls for tender. The areas for tender for an offshore wind farm (both near-shore 
and located in the exclusive economic zone) are set in the Renewable Energy Act. 
For a given suitable project with a defined geographical area and rated capacity, 
the Danish Energy Agency invites applicants to submit a quotation for the fixed 
price that the applicant is willing to receive for producing electricity for a defined 
number of full-load hours, normally 50 000. According to [73], the tender 
procedure in Denmark provides several measures to assure a proper degree of 
security of investment and a simplified process for bidders, a one-stop-shop 
procedure, and providing the draft permits. Additionally, the required 
environmental impact assessment has to be performed by Danish authorities 













Figure 16: Grid connection procedure for offshore wind farms in Belgium. 
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 Open-door procedure 43 . Under this method, the project developer takes the 
initiative to establish an offshore wind farm in a specific area. Before processing 
the application, the Danish Energy Agency initiates a hearing with other 
government bodies to analyse whether other major public interests can interfere 
on the project implementation. If the area can be developed, the Danish Energy 
Agency issues an approval to carry out the preliminary investigations including an 
Environmental Impact Assessment. Areas previously established for tendering 
under the Renewable Energy Act cannot be applied under this procedure [80]. 
The procedure includes a measure addressed to increase local acceptance for near-
shore wind farms: the developer of an offshore wind farm is obliged to offer at least 
20 % of its property to residents in the municipalities that have a coastline within 16 
km of the project [80]. Nevertheless, there is only an obligation to offer this share, not 
to achieve it [81]. 
Grid connection 
According to [82], the procedure for grid connection is widely considered as simple 
and transparent, despite the procedural steps not being specified by law. The grid 
operator is obliged to connect any wind power plant that fulfils the grid connection 
requirements set by the Ministry for Energy [37]. 
For the further-offshore, such as the ongoing tenders for Kriegers Flak and Horns Rev 
3, the transmission system operator(Energinet.dk) bears the costs of grid connection 
to the offshore substation (ultra-shallow approach) [82], and is required to ensure the 
connection to be operative at the agreed date. 
In order to ensure coordination with the transmission system operator, the developer 
must provide the following information [83]: 
 Submit technical information on equipment for installation at the platform (e.g. 
September 2015 for Horns Rev 3). 
 Equipment for installation at the platform is to be delivered to the yard no later 
than a previously defined date (e.g. November 2015 for Horns Rev 3). 
 The developer should provide information no later than 1 December 2015 
(again in the case of Horns Rev 3) about the desired date for energisation of 
the transformer platform and installation of cables. 
However, plant developers of near-shore projects, either established by tenders or by 
the open-door procedure, have to bear the costs of their own offshore substation and 
connection to land (shallow approach) [73]. The grid connection procedure is 
summarised in Figure 17. The process starts with submission of the necessary permits 
and licences together with the application to the grid operator. Next, grid operator 
and plant developer conclude a connection agreement. When the plant is 
                                                        
 
43 All recent operating wind farms have tariffs established by call for tenders. 
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commissioned, the grid operator gives temporary permission to operate before final 




In Germany, the maritime spatial plan for the Exclusive Economic Zones is performed 
by the Bundesministerium für Verkehr und digitale Infrastruktur, BMVI, (Federal Ministry 
of Transport and Digital Infrastructure) and, in the case of territorial waters (12 nautical 
mile zone), by the corresponding state authority. The Federal Maritime and 
Hydrographic Agency is in charge of the application procedure for wind farms located 
in the German exclusive economic zone [84]. 
In order to obtain the approval, the wind farm project has to meet the following 
conditions: 
1. It is not a risk to the safety and efficiency of navigation. 
2. It is not damaging to the marine environment. 
The approval and permit process consist of the following steps: 
1. Project application and participation of public interest parties (such as water 
and shipping authorities, Federal Agency for Nature Conservation, etc.) and 
interest groups (fishing, nature conservation associations, etc.). 
2. Application conference. The applicant gives a presentation about the project 
discussing the potential conflict with the protected assets (fauna, soil, water, 
etc.) in the Offshore Installations Ordinance [85] and with other private or public 
stakeholders involved in the project. 
3. Preparation of the report and further documents. On the basis of the 
environmental studies, the applicant prepares an Environmental Impact 
Assessment. A risk analysis dealing with the probability of vessels colliding with 
wind farm installations is also mandatory. 
4. Consideration and approval. After receiving the documents, the Federal 
Maritime and Hydrographic Agency passes the documents to the competent 
Figure 17: Grid connection procedure for offshore wind farms (open-door procedure and near-
shore projects by tenders) in Denmark. 
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authorities and associations asking for their comments. The Federal Maritime 
and Hydrographic Agency then reviews if the requirements for granting 
approval have been met. At the same time, the competent regional authority 
deliberates if consent can be granted in relation to safety and efficiency of 
navigation. 
If both authorities agree with the project, the approval is issued for a period of 25 
years. Also, to prevent the areas to be reserved for future use, construction of the wind 
farm has to start within 2.5 years after notification of the approval [85]. 
Grid connection 
Based on the amended Renewables Energy Act, in August 2014, the Federal Network 
Agency (BNetzA) approved a new procedure for grid connection capacity allocation. It 
reflects the government’s target to achieve 6.5GW of offshore wind in 2020. Capacity 
allocations up to 7.7 GW are possible to the end of 2017 and 6.5GW afterwards up to 
2020 (the procedure also provides for capacity withdrawals in case development 
deadlines are not achieved in wind farms which already have an unconditional grid 
connection commitment). From 2020 onwards, 800MW are added each year. 
If demand surpasses the connection capacity offered, e.g. at an individual grid 
connection line, capacity allocation is carried out through a tender process. Admission 
to the capacity allocation process requires: BSH permit, a soil study report, and the 
availability of free capacity within the cluster on a grid connection line. Within the wind 
farms allowed to participate in such a tender, the offer price is the only criteria for 
capacity allocation. The winners of the tender have to pay the pay-as-cleared price. At 
the beginning of each capacity allocation procedure, BNetzA publishes the available 
capacity to reach the government’s target and the free capacity on each grid 
connection line. Initially this process shall be conducted every 9 months, provided the 
prior tender has already finished and free capacity is available. 
 
4.4. The Netherlands 
A draft for a new offshore wind act was published on 20 March 2014 by the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment. On 26 
September 2014, the Dutch government announced the chosen areas for offshore 
wind deployment: Borssele (1 400 MW), Hollandse Kust Zuid-Holland (1 400 MW) and 
Hollandse Kust Noord-Holland (700 MW). The first area, Borssele, is located outside the 
12-mile zone and it was already designated in 2009 under the National Water Plan 
2009-2015. The other two designated areas (Hollandse Kust Zuid-Holland and 
Hollandse Kust Noord-Holland) are also located outside the territorial waters but 
expanded with narrow strips to a maximum of 2 nautical miles within the 12-mile zone 
[86]. 
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Under the new act, a tender procedure is proposed. The new projects can only be 
constructed in previously-defined plots within the designated areas under the National 
Water Plan. The main steps of the proposed procedure are: 
 Designation under the National Water Plan of the areas for offshore wind 
energy deployment. 
 Selection of the new wind farm location and conditions of construction and 
operation. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of Infrastructure 
and the Environment are the competent authorities in this regard. An 
environmental impact assessment and an appropriate assessment on the basis 
of the Dutch Nature Conservation Act are also required at this stage. 
 During the decision process on the location of wind farms, the Government 
performs specific studies about wind, soil and water conditions in order to 
provide a good insight into the construction and operation conditions. 
 The developer of the wind farm is finally selected by a tender procedure where 
the lowest bidder (if the bid is below the previously defined maximum amount) 
is awarded to construct and operate the project. 
Grid connection 
Under the general case the cost of the connection is borne by the plant developer in 
a shallow approach. The general process regarding grid connection is shown in Figure 
18. The first step is requesting grid connection to the grid operator. Secondly, the grid 
operator will provide a preliminary design about how the connection will be 
implemented. If the plant developer agrees with the proposed design, the connection 
agreement is signed [87]. 
Under the new tenders, however, the Netherlands is presenting a new approach, which 
could be called hyper-shallow, for which the installation of the offshore substation is 
responsibility of the TSO, TenneT, and the tender winners are offered the substation 
as connecting point. 
4.5. The United Kingdom 
The Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 divides the UK marine areas into marine 
planning regions with an associated planning authority who prepares a marine plan 












Figure 18: Grid connection procedure for offshore wind farms in the Netherlands. 
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Decisions on where offshore wind farms can be located are made in two stages [88]. 
First, the Department for Energy and Climate Change performs the Offshore Energy 
Strategic Environmental Assessment. Second, the Crown Estate (which grants leases 
for the use of the UK seabed) designs the suitable zones. In 2009, under the 
programme Round 3, a competitive process awarded these zones to different 
developers. 
In England and Wales, depending on project size, the regulatory planning authority 
varies [89]: 
 Marine licencing for activities in the sea is the responsibility of the Marine 
Management Organisation who can also grant development consent for 
offshore renewable projects under 100MW. 
 For projects above 100MW, the development consent application is assessed 
by the Planning Inspectorate and the recommendation is made to the Secretary 
of State for Energy and Climate Change who makes the final decision. 
 Development consent for any associated development (for example onshore 
substation) located in Wales is the responsibility of the relevant Welsh planning 
authority. 
In Scotland, licensing is organised by a one-stop-shop model managed by the Marine 
Scotland Licensing Operations Team [90]. 
Grid connection 
The main difference between the connection procedures in the UK and other countries 
is that transmission infrastructure to shore is (in general) built by the developer, and 
then outsourced (through a tender) to other entities that receive a transmission fee. 
This tender process can occur at various stages of the construction process [92]: 
 Early-build approach. The operator of the offshore transmission system is 
responsible for planning, consenting, construction, operation and ownership of 
the link. 
 Late-build approach. The operator of the transmission system is responsible for 
construction, operation and ownership of the link. 
 Generator-build approach. The plant developer builds the connection system 
and the transmission system operator is responsible for its operation and 
ownership. To date this is the most common procedure. 
Depending on the chosen option (connection built by the plant owner or by the 
offshore system operator), the revenues stream takes into account the compensation 
for the assumed costs in each case (planning, consenting, construction and/or 
operating costs). 
As shown in Figure 19, the connection procedure is composed of the following steps 
[91]: 
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1. The plant developer submits the connection application to the transmission 
system operator (National Grid). 
2. The transmission system operator prepares a transmission owner reinforcement 
instruction. 
3. Within three months after the reception of the application, the transmission 
system operator makes a connection offer, including the onshore connection 
point. 
4. The generator accepts/rejects the connection offer within the following three 
months. 
5. A tender process is undertaken by the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets, in 
case of a late-build approach. 
6. The offshore transmission system operator is selected. 
7. Signing of agreements 
This procedure is an extension of the onshore connection regime. For onshore 
installations, the connection of new generators is supervised by the national 
transmission operator and finally transferred to the onshore transmission operator 
responsible for the corresponding area (National Grid Electricity Transmission for 
England and Wales, Scottish Power Transmission Limited for southern Scotland, and 
Scottish Hydro-Electric Transmission Limited for northern Scotland). However, in the 
case of a new offshore generator, there is no responsible transmission operator. 




Figure 19: Connection procedure for offshore wind farms in United Kingdom. 
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